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Abstract
Theories of a “new imperialism” assume that world capitalism in the 21st century is still made 
up of “domestic capitals” and that distinct national economies and world political dynamics 
are driven by US eff orts to off set the decline in hegemony amidst heightened inter-imperialist 
rivalry. These theories ignore empirical evidence on the transnationalization of capital and the 
increasingly salient role of transnational state apparatuses in imposing capitalist domination 
beyond the logic of the inter-state system. I argue here that US interventionism is not a depar-
ture from capitalist globalization but a response to its crisis. The class relations of global capital-
ism are now so deeply internalized within every nation-state that the classical image of 
imperialism as a relation of external domination is outdated. The end of the extensive enlarge-
ment of capitalism is the end of the imperialist era of world capitalism. The implacable logic 
of global accumulation is now largely internal to the complex of fractious political institutions 
through which ruling groups attempt to manage those relations. We need a theory of capitalist 
expansion – of the political processes and the institutions through which such expansion takes 
place, the class relations and spatial dynamics it involves.
Mas all de la teoría del imperialismo: capitalismo global y estado transnacional
Las teorías del nuevo imperialismo asumen que el capitalismo mundial del siglo 21 se com-
pone aún de “capitales nacionales” y economías nacionales distintas y que la dinámica política 
inter nacional están dirigidas por el esfuerzo de US para contrarrestar su declive hegemónico 
como consecuencia de la rivalidad internacional. Estas teorías ignoran la evidencia empírica 
acerca de la transnaciona lización del capital y el papel crecientemente preponderante de los 
mecanismos del Estado transnacional para imponer una dominación capitalista más allá de la 
lógica del sistema Interestatal. Aquí argumento que el intervencionismo americano no es una 
desviación de la globalización capitalista sino una respuesta a su crisis. Las relaciones de clase 
del capitalismo global están hoy tan profundamente internalizadas dentro de cada Estado 
nación que la imagen clásica del imperialismo como una relación de dominación externa está 
pasada de moda. El fi n de la ampliación extensiva del capita lismo es el fi n de la era imperialista del 
capitalismo mundial. La lógica implacable de la acumulación global es ahora  principalmente 
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 DOI: 10.1163/187188607X163176
SWB 2,1_f3_5-26.indd   5 1/8/07   1:03:57 PM
1
Robinson: Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Trans
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2007
6 W. I. Robinson / Societies Without Borders 2 (2007) 5–26
interna al complejo de instituciones políticas fragmentadas a través de las que los grupos de 
poder tratan de gestionar esas relaciones. Necesitamos una teoría de la expansión capitalista- 
de los procesos políticos y las  instituciones a cuyo través se produce esa expansión, de las nue-
vas relaciones entre clase y dinámicas espaciales.
A travers la frontière de la théorie de l’impérialisme: le capitalisme global et l’état 
 transnational
Les théories d’un ‘nouvel impérialisme’ supposent que le capitalisme mondial au 21ème siècle se 
compose toujours des capitaux domestiques et des économies nationaux distinctes. Ils sup-
posent aussi que la dynamique politique mondiale est mené par l’eff ort américain pour recon-
stituer sa proper hégémonie dans la rivalité intensifi ée interimpérialiste. Ces théories ignorent 
l’évidence empirique sur la mondialisation du capital et le rôle de plus en plus saillant des 
appareillages transnationaux d’état d’imposer la domination capitaliste au-delà de la logique 
du système transnational. Je constate du fait ici que l’interventionnisme des Etats-Unis n’est 
pas un départ de la mondialisation capitaliste mais, contrairement, elle est une réponse à sa 
crise. Les relations de classe du capitalisme mondial sont maintenant si profondément inter-
nalisées dans chaque Ètat-nation que l’image classique de l’impérialisme comme relation de la 
domination externe est démodée. La fi n de l’agrandissement étendu du capitalisme est la fi n de 
l’ère impérialiste du capitalisme du monde. La logique implacable de l’accumulation globale 
est maintenant en grande partie interne au complexe des corps politiques grincheux par 
lesquels les groupes puissants essaient de contrôler ces relations. Nous avons besoin d’une 
théorie d’expansion capitaliste – des processus politiques et des institutions par lesquels une 
telle expansion a lieu, des relations de classe et de la dynamique spatiale qu’elle implique.
Keywords
globalization, imperialism, capitalism, transnational state, David Harvey
Introduction
Theories of a “new imperialism” that have proliferated in the years following 
the events of September 2001 assume that the United States has set about to 
extend global empire and off set the decline in its hegemony amidst height-
ened inter-imperialist rivalry. Some argue that unilateral US intervention -
ism belies earlier claims that we are moving towards a globalized world order 
and refute misguided theories of globalization.1 These theories rest on a 
crustaceous bed of assumptions that need to be peeled back if we are to get at 
the root of 21st century global social and political dynamics. Grounded in the 
classical statements of Lenin and Hilferding, they are based on the assump-
tion of a world of rival national capitals and economies, confl ict among core 
1) See, e.g., Pozo 2006; Henwood 2003. 
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capitalist powers, the exploitation by these powers of peripheral regions, and 
a nation-state centered framework for analyzing global dynamics. Hilferd-
ing, in his classic study on imperialism, Finance Capital, argued that national 
capitalist monopolies turn to the state for assistance in acquiring interna-
tional markets and that this state intervention inevitably leads to intense 
political-economy rivalries among nation-states.2 Lenin, in his 1917  pamphlet 
Imperialism: The Latest Stage of Capitalism, stressed the rise of national 
fi nancial-industrial combines that struggle to divide and redivide the world 
amongst themselves through their respective nation-states. The rivalry 
among these competing national capitals led to inter-state competition, mil-
itary confl ict and war among the main capitalist countries.
Hilferding, Lenin, and others analyzing the world of the early 20th cen-
tury established this Marxist analytical framework of rival national capitals 
that was carried by subsequent political economists into the latter 20th cen-
tury via theories of dependency and the world system, radical international 
relations theory, studies of US intervention, and so on. This outdated frame-
work of competing national capitals continues to inform observers of world 
dynamics in the early 21st century. The following assertion by Klare is typi-
cal: “By geopolitics or geopolitical competition, I mean the contention 
between great powers and aspiring great powers for control over territory, 
resources, and important geographical positions, such as ports and harbors, 
canals, river systems, oases, and other sources of wealth and infl uence. Today 
we are seeing a resurgence of unabashed geopolitical ideology among the 
leadership cadres of the major powers . . . the best way to see what’s happening 
today in Iraq and elsewhere is through a geopolitical prism.”3 Such thinking 
provides the  scaff olding for a torrent of “new imperialism” literature that has 
appeared since 2001.4
But capitalism has changed fundamentally since the days of Lenin, Hilfer-
ding, and Bukharin. We have entered a qualitatively new transnational stage 
in the ongoing evolution of world capitalism, which is marked by a number 
of fundamental shift s in the capitalist system, among them: the rise of truly 
transnational capital and the integration of every country into a new global 
production and fi nancial system; the appearance of a new transnational 
2) Hilderding 1910, p. 322.
3) Klare 2003, pp. 51–52.
4) See, inter-alia, Foster 2003, 2006; Wood 2003; Harvey 2005; Pozo 2006; Kiely 2006; 
Henwood 2003; Brenner 2002; Arrighi 2005; Gowan 1999; Klare 2003; Bello 2005; 
Monthly Review 2003).
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 capitalist class (TCC), a class group grounded in new global markets and 
circuits of accumulation, rather than national markets and circuits; the rise 
of  transnational state (TNS) apparatuses, and the appearance of novel rela-
tions of power and inequality in global society. The dynamics of this emerg-
ing stage in world capitalism cannot be understood through the lens of 
nation-state centric thinking. This is not to say that the nation-state is no 
longer  important but that the system of nation-states as discrete interacting 
units – the inter-state system – is no longer the organizing principle of capi-
talist development, or the primary institutional framework that shapes social 
and class forces and political dynamics.5
The Myth of National Economies and the Reality of Transnational 
Capital
Th e hallmark of “new imperialism” theories is the assumption that world 
capitalism in the 21st century is made up of “domestic capitals” and distinct 
national economies that interact with one another, and a concomitant “real-
ist” analysis of world politics as driven by the pursuit by governments of their 
“national interest.” Gowan, for instance, in his oft -cited study The Global 
Gamble: Washington’s Bid for World Dominance,6 refers incessantly to an 
“American capitalism,” a “German capitalism,” an “Italian capitalism,” a 
“French capitalism,” and so on, each a discernible and discrete economic sys-
tem featuring distinctly organized national capitalist classes involved in sets 
of national competitive relationships. In another leading treatise on the “new 
imperialism,” Empire of Capital, Ellen Meiksins Wood asserts that “the 
national organization of capitalist economies has remained stubbornly 
 persistent.”7
Are we to assume, as Wood, Gowan, and others do, although they provide 
not a shred of empirical evidence, that capital remains organized, as it was in 
earlier moments of the world capitalist system, along national lines and that 
the development of capital has stopped frozen in its nation-state form? The 
inter-state/nation-state framework obliges “new imperialism” scholars to 
5) For elaborations on these propositions, see, inter-alia, Robinson 2006b, 2007, 2005a, 
2005b, 2004, 2003, 2002, 1996.
6) Gowan 1999, and see also 2003.
7) Wood 2003, p. 23.
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advance this unproblematized notion of “national interests” to explain global 
political dynamics. What does “national interests” mean? Marxists have his-
torically rejected notions of “national interests” as an ideological subterfuge 
for class and social group interests. What is a “national economy”? Is it a 
country with a closed market? Protected territorially-based production cir-
cuits? The predominance of national capitals? An insulated national fi nan-
cial system? No capitalist country in the world fi ts this description.
There is a mounting body of empirical evidence that demonstrates the 
transnationalization of capital. This evidence strongly suggests that the giant 
conglomerates of the Fortune 500 ceased to be “US” corporations in the 
 latter part of the 20th century and increasingly represented transnational 
capitalist groups.8 This reality of transnationalization can no longer be 
 disputed, nor can its signifi cance for macro-social theories and for analysis of 
world political-economic dynamics. One need only glean daily headlines 
from the world media to discover endless reams of anecdotal evidence to 
complement the accumulation of systematic data on transnationalization. 
IBM’s chair and CEO, Samuel Palmisano, affi  rms in a June 2006 article in 
the Financial Times of London, for instance, that use of the very word 
 “multinational corporation” suggests “how antiquated our thinking about it 
is.” He continues:
The emerging business model of the 21st century is not, in fact ‘multinational’. This new 
kind of organization – at IBM we call it ‘the globally integrated enterprise’ – is very dif-
ferent in its structure and operations. . . . In the multinational model, companies built 
local production capacity within key markets, while performing other tasks on a global 
basis . . . American multi nationals such as General Motors, Ford and IBM built plants 
and established local workforce policies in Europe and Asia, but kept research and devel-
opment and product design principally in the ‘home country’.9
The spread of multinationals in this way constituted internationalization, in 
contrast to more recent transnationalization:
The globally integrated enterprise, in contrast, fashions its strategy, management and 
 operations to integrate production – and deliver value to clients – worldwide. That has 
been made possible by shared technologies and shared business standards, built on top 
8) For summaries and assessments of this evidence, see Robinson 2004; Sklair 2001, 2002; 
Kentor 2005; Kentor and Jang 2003; UNCTAD various years; Carroll and Carson 2003; 
Carroll and Fennema 2002; Dicken 2003.
9) Palmisano 2006, p.19.
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of a global information technology and communications infrastructure. . . . Today, inno-
vation is inherently global.10
In turn, IBM is one of the largest investors in India, which has become a 
major platform for transnational service provision to the global economy. If 
the decentralization and dispersal around the world of  manufacturing pro-
cesses represented the leading edge of an earlier wave of globalization, the 
current wave involves the decentralization and global dispersal of such ser-
vices as data processing, insurance claims, phone operators, call centers, 
 soft ware production, marketing, journalism and publishing, advertising, 
and banking – which are now undertaken through complex webs of out-
sourcing, subcontracting and transnational alliances among fi rms. IBM went 
from 9,000 employees in India in 2004 to 43,000 (out of 329,000 world-
wide) in 2006, and this does not include thousands of workers in local fi rms 
that have been subcontracted by IBM or by Indian IBM partner fi rms.11 
Some of IBM’s growth in India has come from mergers between IBM and 
companies previously launched by Indian investors as outsourcing fi rms, 
such as Dagsh eSErvices of New Delhi, which went from 6,000 to 20,000 
back-offi  ce employees aft er its merger with IBM. In this way, and in countless 
other examples across the globe, national capitalist groups become swept up 
into global circuits of accumulation and into TCC formation.
My global capitalism approach shares little or nothing with Karl Kautsky’s 
earlier “ultraimperialism” or “superimperialism” thesis. Kautsy, in his 1914 
essay Ultra-Imperialism,12 assumed capital would remain national in its 
essence and suggested that national capitals would collude internationally 
instead of compete, whereas my theory on the TCC emphasizes that confl ict 
among capitals is endemic to the system but that such competition takes on 
new forms in the age of globalization not necessarily expressed as national 
rivalry. The TCC thesis does not suggest there are no longer national and 
regional capitals, or that the TCC is internally unifi ed, free of confl ict, and 
consistently acts as a coherent political actor. Nonetheless, the TCC has 
established itself as a class group without a national identity and in competi-
tion with nationally-based capitals. There is confl ict between national and 
transnational fractions of capital. Moreover, rivalry and competition are 
10) Palmisano 2006, p. 19.
11) Rai 2006.
12) Kautsy 1914.
SWB 2,1_f3_5-26.indd   10 1/8/07   1:03:59 PM
6
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol2/iss1/2
DOI: 101163/187188607X163176
 W. I. Robinson / Societies Without Borders 2 (2007) 5–26 11
fi erce among transnational conglomerations that turn to numerous institu-
tional channels, including multiple national states, to pursue their interests. 
For instance, IBM and its local Indian shareholders and partners compete for 
service outsourcing contracts, explains Rai, with Cognizant Technology 
Solutions, a company based in Teaneck, New Jersey and of IBM’s chief rivals 
in the Indian subcontinent. The rivalry between IBM and Cognizant cannot 
be considered competition between national capitals of distinct countries 
and both groups turn to the US and the Indian state to seek advantage over 
competitors.
Reifi cation and Theoreticism in “New Imperialism” Theories:
The Antinomies of David Harvey
Most “new imperialism” theorists acknowledge to varying degrees that 
changes have taken place, and particularly, that capital has become more 
global. Yet capital in these accounts has not transnationalized; it has “inter-
nationalized.” These accounts are concerned with explaining the inter-
national order, which by defi nition places the focus on inter-state dynamics 
exclusive of the trans-national. This need to accommodate the reality of 
transnationalizing capital within a nation-state centric framework for ana-
lyzing world political dynamics leads “new imperialism” theories to a dual-
ism of the economic and the political.
David Harvey, in perhaps the landmark treatise among this literature, The 
New Imperialism, argues that capital is economic and globalizes but states are 
political and pursue a self-interested territorial logic.13 Harvey’s theory starts 
with the notion that 
the fundamental point is to see the territorial and the capitalist logic of power as distinct 
from each other. . . . The relation between these two logics should be seen, therefore, as 
problematic and oft en contradictory . . . rather than as functional or one-sided. This dia-
lectical relation sets the stage for an analysis of capitalist imperialism in terms of the 
intersection of these two distinctive but intertwined logics of power.14 
Harvey’s is not, however, a dialectical but a mechanical approach. The diff er-
ent  dimensions of social reality in the dialectical approach do not have an 
“independent” status insofar as each aspect of reality is constituted by, and is 
13) Harvey 2003.
14) Harvey 2003, pp. 29–30.
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 constitutive of, a larger whole of which it is an internal element. Distinct 
dimensions of social reality may be analytically distinct yet are internally 
interpenetrated and mutually constitutive of each other as internal elements of 
a more encompassing process, so that, for example, the economic/capital and 
the political/state are internal to capitalist relations.
It is remarkable that Harvey proposes such a separation since the history 
of modern critical thought – from Polanyi to Poulantzas and Gramsci, among 
others, not to mention 50 years of historical materialist theorizing on the 
state – has demonstrated both the formal (apparent) separation of the eco-
nomic and the political under the capitalist mode of production and the illu-
sion that such a separation is organic or real.15 This separation has its 
genealogy in the rise of the market and its apparently “pure” economic com-
pulsion. This separation appears in social thought with the breakup of polit-
ical economy, the rise of  classical economics and bourgeois social science, 
and disciplinary fragmentation.16 Such a separation of the economic from 
the political was a hallmark of the structural functionalism that dominated 
much of mid-20th century social  science. Structural functionalism separated 
distinct spheres of the social totality and conferred a functional autonomy to 
each subsphere which was seen as externally related to other subspheres in a 
way similar to Harvey’s notion of separate state and capital logics that may or 
may not coincide.
Harvey off ers no explicit conception of the state but he acknowledges that 
state behavior has “depended on how the state has been constituted and by 
whom.”17 Yet dual logics of state and capital ignore the real-world policy-
making process in which the state extends backward, is grounded in the 
forces of civil society, and is fused in a myriad of ways with capital itself. It is 
incumbent to ask in what ways transnational social forces may infl uence a 
reconstitution of state institutions. To the extent that civil society – social 
forces – and capital are transnationalizing our analysis of the state cannot 
remain frozen at a nation-state level. The essential problematic that should 
concern us in attempting to explain phenomena associated with the “new 
imperialism” is the political management – or rule – of global capitalism. 
The theoretical gauntlet is how to understand the exercise of political domi-
nation in relation to the institutions available to dominant groups and sets of 
15) For a discussion, see Robinson 1996.
16) See, inter-alia, Th erborn 1985, 1999; Zeitlin 2000. 
17) Harvey 2003, p. 91.
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changing historical relations among social forces – that is, how are the politi-
cal and the economic articulated in the current era? This requires a concep-
tion of agency and institutions.
But instead of off ering an ontology of agency and how it operates through 
historically constituted institutions, much of the “new imperialism” litera-
ture reifi es these institutions. Institutions are but institutionalized – that is, 
codifi ed – patterns of interaction among social forces that structure diff erent 
aspects of their material relations. When we explain global dynamics in terms 
of institutions that have an existence or agency independent of social forces 
we are reifying these institutions. Critical state theories and Gramscian IPE18 
have taught us, despite their limitations, that the story starts – and ends – 
with historically situated social forces as collective agents. To critique a 
nation-state framework of analysis as I do, is not, as my critics claim19 to dis-
miss the nation-state but to dereify it. Reifying categories leads to realist 
analyses of state power and the inter-state system. Realism presumes that the 
world economy is divided up into distinct national economies that interact 
with one another. Each national economy is a billiard ball banging back and 
forth on each other. This billiard image is then applied to explain global 
political dynamics in terms of nation-states as discrete interacting units (the 
inter-state system).
The state, says Harvey, in reverting to the realist approach, “struggles 
 toassert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large.”20 But Harvey 
does not stop with this reifi cation of the state. He introduces an additional 
territorial reifi cation, so that territorial relations become immanent to social 
relations. “The wealth and well-being of particular territories are augmented 
at the expense of others,” writes Harvey.21 This is a remarkably reifi ed image – 
“territories” rather than social groups have “wealth” (accumulated values) 
and enjoy “well being.” Harvey gives space in this way an independent exis-
tence as a social/political force in the form of territory in order to advance 
his thesis of the “new imperialism.” It is not how social forces are organized 
both in space and through institutions that is the focus. Rather, for Harvey, 
territory acquires a social existence of its own, an agentic logic. We are told 
that “territorial entities” engage in practices of production, commerce, and 
18) See inter-alia Cox 1987; Simon 1991.
19) See inter-alia, Pozo 2006; Kiely 2006.
20) Harvey 2003, p. 26.
21) Harvey 2003, p. 32.
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so on. Do “territorial entities” really do these things? Or is it not that in the 
real world, individuals and social groups engage in production, commerce, 
and so on? And they do so via institutions through which they organize, 
 systematize, and demarcate their activities as agents. Social groups became 
aggregated and organized in the modern era through the particular 
 institu tional form of the territorial-based nation state. But this particular 
institutional form does not acquire a life of its own and neither is it immu-
table. Nation-states continue to exist but their nature and meaning evolve 
as social relations and structures become transformed; particular, as they 
transnationalize.
Drawing on insights from Lafebvre, Marx, Luxemburg, and others,  Harvey 
earlier introduced the highly fertile notion of spatial (or spatial-temporal) 
fi xes to understand how capital momentarily resolves contradictions 
 (particularly, crises of overaccumulation) in one place by displacing them 
to other places through geographic expansion and spatial reorganization. 
Following Marx’ famous observation that the expanded accumulation of 
capital involves the progressive “annihilation of space through time,” he also 
coined the term “time-space compression” in reference to globalization as a 
process involving a new burst of time-space compression in the world capi-
talist  system.22
But “places” have no existence or meaning in and of themselves. It is peo-
ple living in particular spaces that do this dis-placing (literally), these spatio-
temporal fi xes. The “asymmetric exchange relations” that are at the heart of 
Harvey’s emphasis on the territorial basis of the “new imperialism” must be 
for Harvey territorial exchange relations. But not only that: they must be 
nation-state territorial exchanges. But exchange relations are social relations, 
exchanges among particular social groups. There is nothing in the concept of 
asymmetric exchanges that by fi at gives them a territorial expression; no rea-
son to assume that uneven exchanges are necessarily exchanges that take place 
between distinct territories, much less specifi cally between distinct nation-
states. That they do or do not acquire such an expression is one of historical, 
empirical, and conjunctural analysis. Certainly spatial relations among social 
forces have historically been mediated in large part by territory; spatial rela-
tions have been territorially-defi ned relations. But this territorialization is in 
no way immanent to social relations and may well be fading in signifi cance as 
globalization advances.
22) Harvey 1982, 1990.
SWB 2,1_f3_5-26.indd   14 1/8/07   1:04:00 PM
10
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol2/iss1/2
DOI: 101163/187188607X163176
 W. I. Robinson / Societies Without Borders 2 (2007) 5–26 15
Any theory of globalization must address the matter of place and space, 
including changing spatial relations among social forces and how social 
 relations are spatialized. This has not been satisfactorily accomplished, 
despite a spate of theoretical proposition, ranging from Castell’s “space of 
fl ows” replacing the “space of place.”23 and Giddens “time-space distancia-
tion” as the “lift ing” of social relations from territorial place and their stretch-
ing around the globe in ways that may eliminate territorial friction.24 This 
notion of ongoing and novel reconfi gurations of time and social space is cen-
tral to a number of globalization theories. It in turn points to the larger theo-
retical issue of the relationship of social structure to space, the notion of 
space as the material basis for social practices, and the changing relationship 
under globalization between territoriality/geography, institutions, and social 
structures. The crucial question here is the ways in which globalization may 
be transforming the spatial dynamics of accumulation and the institutional 
arrangements through which it takes place. The subject – literally, that is, the 
agents/makers of the social world – is not global space but people in those spaces. 
What is central, therefore, is a spatial reconfi guration of social relations 
beyond a nation-state/inter-state framework, if not indeed even beyond 
 territory.
States are institutionalized social relations and territorial actors to the 
extent that those social relations are territorialized. Nation-states are social 
relations that have historically been territorialized but those relations are not 
by defi nition territorial. To the extent that the US and other national states 
promote deterritorializing social and economic processes they are not terri-
torial actors. The US state can hardly be considered as acting territorially 
when it promotes the global relocation of accumulation processes that were 
previously concentrated in US territory. Harvey’s approach is at odds to 
explain such behavior since by his defi nition the US state must promote its 
own territorial aggrandizement. Harvey observes that as local banking was 
supplanted by national banking in the development of capitalism “the free 
fl ow of money capital across the national space altered regional dynamics.”25 
In the same vein we can argue that the free fl ow of capital across global space 
alters these dynamics on a worldwide scale.
Let us return to the question: why would Harvey propose separate logics 
for the economic and the political – for capital and the state? By separating 
23) Castells 1996.
24) Giddens 1990. 
25) Harvey 2003, p. 106. 
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the political and the economic he is able to claim that indeed globaliza -
tion has transformed the spatial dynamics of accumulation – hence capital 
 globalizes – but that the institutional arrangements of such global accumula-
tion remain territorial as nation-states. The state has its own independent 
logic that brings it into an external relation to globalizing capital. Here we 
arrive at the pitfall of theoreticism. If one starts with the theoretical assump-
tion that the world is made up of independent, territorial-based nation states 
and that this particular institutional-political form is something immanent 
to the modern world – Wood makes the assumption explicit, a law of capital-
ism; for Harvey it seems implicit – then the changing world of the 21st century 
must be explained by theoretical fi at in these terms. Reality must be made to 
conform to the theoretical conception of an immutable nation-state based, 
inter-state political and institutional order. But since Harvey acknowledges 
the reality of globalizing capital he is therefore forced to separate the logic of 
that globalizing capital from that of territorially-based states; he is forced 
either to abandon the theoretical construct altogether or to build it upon a 
dualism of the economic and the political, of capital and the state.
Theory needs to illuminate reality, not make reality conform to it. The 
pitfall of this theoreticism is to develop analyses and propositions to fi t theo-
retical assumptions. Since received theories establish a frame of an inter-state 
system made up of competing national states, economies and capitals then 
21st century reality must be interpreted so that it fi ts this frame one way or 
another. Such theoreticism forces theorists of the “new imperialism” into a 
schizophrenic dualism of economic and political logics. In any event Harvey 
has trapped  himself in a blind alley that underscores the pitfall. Despite his 
acknowledgement of capital’s transnationalization he concludes that the US 
state’s political/territorial logic is driven now by an eff ort to open up space 
vis-à-vis competitor nation-states for unloading national capital surplus, 
hence the new US imperialism. This inconsistency in Harvey’s argumenta-
tion refl ects a general contradiction in the “new imperialism” literature: the 
dualism of the economic and political, of capital and the state, is negated by 
the claim that the US state functions to serve (US national) capital.
Global Capitalism and the TNS
“New imperialism” theories analyze US foreign policy in relation to the real-
ist assumption of competition among national capitals and consequent polit-
ical and military rivalry among core nation-states. “The US forces open 
capital markets around the world [to bring] specifi c advantages . . . to US 
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fi nancial institutions,” asserts Harvey. The United States engages in height-
ened interventionism to off set its hegemonic decline, says Arrighi26 “Inter-
capitalist rivalry remains the hub of the imperialist wheel,” claims Foster. “In 
the present period of global hegemonic imperialism the United States is 
geared above all to expanding its imperial power to whatever extent possible 
and subordinating the rest of the capitalist world to its interests.”27 Henwood 
insists that US foreign policy in recent years has been singularly aimed at the 
restoration of the relative strength of “American” capitalists;28 and “The 
European Union,” writes Wood, “is potentially a stronger economic power 
than the U.S.”29
Yet, to interrogate Wood’s affi  rmation, empirical study of the global econ-
omy reveals that transnational corporations operate both inside as well out-
side of the territorial bounds of the EU, that transnational investors from all 
countries hold and trade in trillions of euros and dollars each day, that Euro-
pean investors are as deeply integrated into transnational circuits of accumu-
lation that inextricably pass through the “US” economy as are US investors 
into such circuits that pass through the “EU” economy. These transnational 
capitalists operate across US–EU frontiers and have a material and political 
interest in stabilizing the “US” and the “EU” economy and “their” fi nancial 
institutions. Once we belie the realist notion of a world of national  economies 
and national capitals then the logical sequence in “new imperialism” argu-
mentation collapses like a house of cards since the whole edifi ce is  constructed 
on this notion. By coming to grips with the reality of  transnational capital we 
can grasp US foreign policy in its organic relation to the actual structure and 
composition of the dominant social forces in the global capitalist system.
My claim that a TNS apparatus is emerging does not imply that supra-
national institutions such as the IMF or the WTO replace or – in Wood’s 
words – “make irrelevant” the national state. Rather, the national state is 
being transformed and increasingly absorbed functionally into a larger trans-
national institutional structure that involves complex new relations between 
national states and supra or transnational institutions, on the one hand, and 
diverse class and social forces, on the other. As national states are captured by 
transnational capitalist forces they tend to serve the interests of global over 
local accumulation processes. The TNS, for instance, has played a key role in 
26) Arrighi 2005; see also Wallerstein 2006.
27) Foster 2003, p. 13. 
28) Henwood 2003. 
29) Wood 2003, p. 156.
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imposing the neo-liberal model on the old Third World and therefore in 
reinforcing the class relations of global capitalism.
Few commentators suggest that the nation-state is disappearing, or that 
capital can now, or ever has been able to, exist without a state. The observa-
tion by Wood and others that global capital needs (local) states is neither 
original nor particularly controversial. I, among others, have argued for many 
years that a fundamental contradiction of global capitalism is that for his-
toric reasons economic globalization has unfolded within the political/
authority framework of a nation-state system. The real issue is not whether 
global capitalism can dispense with the state – it cannot. Rather, it is that the 
state may be in a process of transformation in consort with the restructuring 
and transformation of world capitalism. The question is, to what extent and 
in what ways may new state forms and institutional confi gurations be emerg-
ing, and how may we theorize these new confi gurations?
There are vital functions that the national state performs for transnational 
capital, among them, sets of local economic policies aimed at achieving mac-
roeconomic equilibrium, the provision of property laws, infrastructure, and 
of course, social control and ideological reproduction. However, national 
states are ill equipped to organize a supranational unifi cation of macroeco-
nomic policies, create a unifi ed fi eld for transnational capital to operate, 
impose transnational trade regimes, supranational “transparency,” and so 
forth. The construction of a supranational legal and regulator system for the 
global economy in recent years has been the task of sets of transnational insti-
tutions whose policy prescriptions and actions have been synchronized with 
those of neo-liberal national state that have been captured by local transna-
tionally-oriented forces.
A transnational institutional structure has played an increasingly salient 
role in coordinating global capitalism and imposing capitalist domination 
beyond national borders. Clearly the IMF, by imposing a structural adjust-
ment program that opens up a given country to the penetration of transna-
tional capital, the subordination of local labor, and the extraction of wealth 
by transnational capitalists, is operating as a state institution to facilitate the 
exploitation of local labor by global capital. “New imperialism” dogma 
reduces these IMF practices to instruments of “US” imperialism.30 Yet I 
know of no single IMF structural adjustment program that creates condi-
tions in the intervened country that favors “US” capital in any special way, 
30) For example, see Bello 2005; Gowan 1999; Wood 2003.
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rather than opening up the intervened country, its labor and resources, to 
capitalists from any corner of the world.
US foreign policy is exercised behind the backs of the public by state man-
agers as proximate policymakers and politicized corporate elites that consti-
tute the ruling class in the formal sense of the term. Nevertheless, state 
policymaking is also a process in which diff erent factions and institutions 
that make up the state apparatus have infl uence over varied quotas of deci-
sion-making at given moments. Tactical and strategic diff erences as well as 
personal and institutional rivalries are played out at the level of proximate 
policymaking in disputes for control over policy. This diff usion of foreign 
policy making power within an elite and levels of (relative) autonomy among 
proximate policymakers can make moments of transition and redefi nition 
appear highly contradictory and can confuse observers, especially when these 
observers that take public discourse at face value or assume that social actors 
are not infl uenced by ideologies that may be in contradiction with interests 
and underlying intent.
The Crisis of Global Capitalism and the US State
“US” imperialism refers to the use by transnational elites of the US state 
apparatus to continue to attempt to expand, defend and stabilize the global 
capitalist system. We face an empire of global capital, as I have argued else-
where,31 headquartered, for evident historical reasons, in Washington. The 
questions for global elites are: In what ways, under what particular condi-
tions, arrangements, and strategies should US state power be wielded? How 
can particular sets of US state managers be responsive and held accountable 
to global elites who are fractious in their actions, dispersed around the world, 
and operating through numerous supranational institutional settings, each 
with distinct histories and particular trajectories?
We are witness to new forms of global capitalist domination, whereby 
intervention is intended to create conditions favorable to the penetration of 
transnational capital and the renewed integration of the intervened region 
into the global system. US intervention facilitates a shift  in power from 
locally and regionally-oriented elites to new groups more favorable to the 
transnational project. The result of US military conquest is not the creation 
31) Robinson 2004, 2005b.
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of exclusive zones for “US” exploitation, as was the result of the Spanish con-
quest of Latin America, the British of South Africa and India, the Dutch of 
Indonesia, and so forth, in earlier moments of the world capitalist system. 
The enhanced class power of capital brought about by these changes is felt 
around the world. We see not a reenactment of this old imperialism but the 
colonization and recolonization of the vanquished for the new global capi-
talism and its agents. The underlying class relation between the TCC and 
the US national state needs to be understood in these terms.
In sum, the US state has attempted to play a leadership role on behalf of 
transnational capitalist interests. That it is increasingly unable to do so points 
not to heightened national rivalry but to the impossibility of the task at hand 
given a spiraling crisis of global capitalism. This crisis involves three interre-
lated dimensions. First is a crisis of social polarization. The system cannot 
meet the needs of a majority of humanity, or even assure minimal social 
reproduction. Second is a structural crisis of overaccumulation. The system 
cannot expand because the marginalization of a signifi cant portion of human-
ity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages 
and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarization of income, has 
reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. The prob-
lem of surplus absorption makes state-driven military spending and the 
growth of military-industrial complexes an outlet for surplus and gives the 
current global order a built-in war drive. Third is a crisis of legitimacy and 
authority. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into 
question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and 
is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges.
This multidimensional crisis of global capitalism has generated intense 
discrepancies and disarray within the globalist ruling bloc. The opposition 
of France, Germany and other countries to the Iraq invasion indicated sharp 
tactical and strategic diff erences over how to respond to crisis, shore up the 
system, and keep it expanding. The political coherence of ruling groups 
always frays when faced with structural and/or legitimacy crises as diff erent 
groups push distinct strategies and tactics or turn to the more immediate 
pursuit of sectoral interests. Faced with the increasingly dim prospects of 
constructing a viable transnational hegemony, in the Gramscian sense of a 
stable system of consensual domination, the transnational bourgeoisie has 
not collapsed back into the nation-state. Global elites have, instead, mustered 
up fragmented and at times incoherent responses involving heightened mili-
tary coercion, the search for a post-Washington consensus, and acrimonious 
internal disputes. The more politically astute among global elites have clam-
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ored in recent years to promote a “post-Washington consensus” project of 
reform – a so-called “globalization with a human face” – in the interests of 
saving the system itself.32 But there were other from within and outside of the 
bloc that called for more radical responses.
Neo-liberalism “peacefully” forced open new areas for global capital in 
the 1980s and the 1990s. This was oft en accomplished through economic 
coercion alone, made possible by the structural power of the global economy 
over individual countries. But this structural power became less eff ective in 
the face of the three-pronged crisis mentioned above. Opportunities for both 
intensive and extensive expansion have been drying up as privatizations ran 
their course, the “socialist” countries became integrated, the consumption of 
high-income sectors worldwide reached ceilings, spending through private 
credit expansion could not be sustained, and so on. The space for “peaceful” 
expansion, both intensive and extensive, has become ever more restricted. 
Military aggression becomes an instrument for prying open new sectors and 
regions, for the forcible restructuring of space in order to further accumula-
tion. The train of neo-liberalism became latched on to military intervention 
and the threat of coercive sanctions as a locomotive for pulling the moribund 
Washington consensus forward. The “war on terrorism” provides a seem-
ingly endless military outlet for surplus capital, generates a colossal defi cit 
that justifi es the ever-deeper dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state and 
locks neo-liberal austerity in place, and legitimates the creation of a police 
state to repress political dissent in the name of security.
In the post 9/11 period the military dimension appears to exercise an 
over-determining infl uence in the reconfi guration of global politics. The 
Bush White House militarized social and economic contradictions, launch-
ing a permanent war mobilization to try to stabilize the system through 
direct coercion. Is this evidence for a new US bid for empire? We need to 
move beyond a conjunctural focus on the Bush regime to grasp the current 
moment and the US role in it. In this sense, interventionism and militarized 
globalization is less a campaign for US hegemony than a contradictory polit-
ical response to the crisis of global  capitalism – to economic stagnation, 
legitimation problems, and the rise of counterhegemonic forces.
Despite the rhetoric of neo-liberalism, the US state is undertaking an 
almost unprecedented role in creating profi t-making opportunities for 
 transnational capital and pushing forward an accumulation process that left  
32) For example, see Stiglitz 2002.
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to its own devices (the “free market”) would likely ground to a halt. A Penta-
gon budget of nearly $500 billion in 2003, an invasion and occupation of 
Iraq with a price tag of over $300 billion by 2006 and a proposed multi-
 billion dollar space program that would rest on a marriage of NASA, the 
military, and an array of private corporate interests must be seen in this 
light. Some have seen the $300 billion invested by the US state in the 
fi rst three years of its Iraq invasion and occupation as evidence that the US 
intervention benefi ts “US capital” to the detriment of other national – e.g., 
“EU” – capitals. However, Bechtel, the Carlyle Group, and Halliburton are 
themselves transnational capital conglomerates.33 It is true that military, oil, 
and engineering/construction companies, many of them headquartered in 
the United States, have managed to secure their particular sectoral interests 
through brazen instrumentalization of the US state under the Bush presi-
dency. However, these companies are themselves transnational and their 
interests are those not of “US capital” in rivalry with other countries but of 
particular transnational clusters in the global economy.
The “creative destruction” of war (and natural and humanitarian disas-
ters) generates new cycles of accumulation through “reconstruction.” And 
the military-energy-engineering-construction complex constitutes one of 
those sectors of global capital that most benefi ts from such “creative destruc-
tion.” Transnational capitalists are themselves aware of the role of the US 
state in opening up new possibilities for unloading of surplus and created 
new investment opportunities. “We’re looking for places to invest around 
the world,” explained one former executive of a Dutch-based oil exploration 
and engineering company, and then “you know, along comes Iraq.”34
 The $300 billion invested by the US state in war and “reconstruction” in 
Iraq between 2003 and 2006 went to a vast array of investors and sub-
 contractors that spanned the globe.35 Kuwaiti Trading and Contracting, 
Alargan Trading of Kuwait, Gulf Catering and Saudi Trading and Construc-
tion Company were just some of the Middle East-based companies that 
shared in the bonanza, along with companies and investor groups as far away 
as South Africa, Bosnia, the Philippines, and India. The picture that emerges 
is one in which the US state mobilizes the resources to feed a vast trans-
national network of profi t making that passes through countless layers of 
33) See, e.g., Brody 2003.
34) As cited in Monthly Review 2004, p. 64.
35) Phinney 2005.
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outsourcing, subcontracting, alliances and collaborative relations, benefi ting 
transnationally-oriented capitalists from many parts of the globe. The US 
state is the pivotal gear in a TNS machinery dedicated to reproducing global 
 capitalism.
Concluding Comments: Imperialism and the Extensive and  Intensive 
Enlargement of Capitalism
If the world is not divided into rival national economies and national capi-
tals, do we still need a theory of imperialism? Is there any contemporary rel-
evance to the concept? In the post-WWII period, and drawing on the 
tradition established by Rosa Luxembourg, Marxists and other critical polit-
ical economists shift ed the main focus in the study of imperialism to the 
mechanisms of core capitalist penetration of Third World countries and the 
appropriation of their surpluses. Imperialism in this sense referred to this 
exploitation and also to the use of state apparatuses by capitals emanating 
from the centers of the world system to facilitate this economic relation 
through military, political, and cultural mechanisms. If we mean by imperial-
ism the relentless pressures for outward expansion of capitalism and the 
 distinct political, military and cultural mechanisms that facilitate that 
 expansion and the appropriation of surpluses it generates then it is a struc-
tural imperative built into capitalism; not a policy of particular core state 
managers (to see it as such was Hobson’s fallacy) but a practice immanent to 
the system itself.
We need tools to conceptualize, analyze, and theorize how this expansion-
ary pressure built into the capitalist system manifests itself in the age of 
 globalization. We need these tools politically so as to help make eff ective our 
confrontation with the system. I would agree to this extent with Kiely that a 
theory of imperialism “remains indispensable for understanding both the 
contemporary world order and the place of the South in that order.”36 Yet, 
even at that, capitalist imperialism is considerably more complex under glo-
balization that the facile North-South/core-periphery framework through 
which it is typically viewed. The class relations of global capitalism are now 
so deeply internalized within every nation-state that the classical image 
of imperialism as a relation of external domination is outdated.37 Failure to 
36) Kiely 2006.
37) Robinson 2006a.
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 comprehend this leads to such superfi cial and misleading conclusions as, for 
instance, that the failure of popular projects to materialize under the rule of 
the Workers Party in Brazil or the African National Congress in South Africa 
is a result of a “sell out” by the leaders of those parties or simply because 
“imperialism” undercut their programs. Imperialism is not about nations but 
about groups exercising the social power – through institutions – to control 
value production, to appropriate surpluses, and to reproduce these arrange-
ments. The challenge for such a theoretical enterprise is to ask: how and 
by whom in the world capitalist system are values produced (organized 
through what institutions), how are they appropriated (through what insti-
tutions), and how are these processes changing through capitalist globaliza-
tion?  During the 500 years since the genesis of the world capitalist system, 
colonialism and imperialism coercively incorporated zones and peoples into 
its fold. This historical process of “primitive accumulation” is coming to a 
close.
The end of the extensive enlargement of capitalism is the end of the impe-
rialist era of world capitalism. The system still conquers space, nature, and 
human beings. It is dehumanizing, genocidal, suicidal, and maniacal. But 
with the exception of a few remaining spaces – Iraq until recently, North 
Korea, etc. – the world has been brought into the system over the past half 
millennium. The implacable logic of accumulation is now largely internal to 
worldwide social relations and to the complex of fractious political institu-
tions through which ruling groups attempt to manage those relations. We 
therefore need a theory of capitalist expansion – of the political processes and 
the institutions through which such expansion takes place, the class relations 
and spatial dynamics it involves.
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